From anti-politics to the event: the anarchism of the evental bodies

Da antipolítica ao acontecimento: o anarquismo dos corpos acontecimentais

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Abstract: *The event, that breaks with the established order, within the states of things with stable representations, can only arise from a post-foundational view of politics, which is not a condominium management of beings from the perspective of mediatizated biopowers, but the emergence of a voice for the voiceless, of the people from the differential demands that at first did not dialogue. The materialist theory of communication presented here emerges from a basic antagonism, a negativity of the instinctual order that circulates in a tensive field from which the parts search in a performative way, while struggling for recognition (Honneth) and visibility, the emergence of disruptive events (Badiou). How can discourses on radical democracy be constituted in this perspective outside the corrupt heralds of the traditional system? How at the moment of the event do anarchist bodies emerge, ready to dive into the process of truth that begins there? In terms of a logic of affections or passions, the path of politics is made from fear to joy, from retention to liberation/emancipation. It is in this direction that we will think of communication as the tensive field of emergency for evental performative policy.*

Keywords: *tensivity; event; policy; affections.*

Resumo: *O acontecimento que rompe com a ordem estabelecida, com os estados de coisas com representações estáveis, só pode surgir a partir de uma visão pós-fundacional de política em que esta não é gestão condominial dos seres a partir dos biopoderes midiatizados, mas surgimento da voz dos que não têm voz, do povo, a partir das demandas diferenciais que, de início, não dialogavam. A*

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teoria materialista da comunicação é aqui pensada a partir de um antagonismo de base, de uma negatividade da ordem pulsional que circula em um campo tensivo a partir do qual as partes buscam performativamente, na luta pelo reconhecimento (Honneth) e pela visibilidade, a emergência de acontecimentos disruptivos (Badiou). Como os discursos pela democracia radical podem, nessa perspectiva, ser constituídos fora dos arautos corrompidos do sistema tradicional? Como, no momento do acontecimento, emergem corpos anarquistas dispostos a mergulhar no processo de verdade que aí se inicia? Em termos de uma lógica dos afetos ou das paixões, o caminho da política se faz do medo para a alegria, da retenção para a libertação/emancipação. Nesta direção é que pensaremos a comunicação entendida como campo tensivo de emergência da política performativa acontecimental.

Palavras-chave: *tensividade; acontecimento; política; afetos.*

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We had, in the last texts (PRADO, 2013, 2015, 2016b, 2016c; PRADO e PRATES, 2017), deepened a communicational and semiotic theoretical perspective for the study of political movements that crosses the discursive theory, the event theory and the tensive semiotics.   In this text, we will approach the communicational theoretical theory to later examine concrete practices.

When tracing the genealogy of neoliberalism, as Foucault did (2008) and as Dardot and Laval (2016) do, it is necessary to analyze discursively the enunciation that gave power to the image of the entrepreneur, progressively emptying the image of the citizen "invested in a collective responsibility" (DARDOT; LAVAL, 2016, p. 381). Thus, in the neoliberal discourse,

> The reference of the public action is not the subject of rights anymore, but a self-entrepreneur actor that makes the most diverse private contracts with other self-entrepreneur actors. This way, the modes of transaction negotiated individually to "solve problems" tend to replace the rules of a public law and the processes of political decision legitimated by the universal suffrage. Far from being "neutral", the managemental reform of public action focus directly against the democratic logic of social citizenship; reinforcing social inequalities in the distribution of aid and in the access of resources regarding employment, health and education, it reinforces the social logics of exclusion that make a rising number of "sub -citizens" and "non-citizens" (DARDOT; LAVAL, 2016, p. 381).

In this neoliberal context, the positive psychology exalts, on one side, the alpha individual, built as a subject with superpowers from the "human dynamos operating for their own well-being and the socioeconomical order", in the expression of Freire Filho (2010, p. 77), and, on the other side, neglects the weak individual, who blame others for their mistakes and frustration, the ones who feel as victims and do not adapt to the world. It adapts well to the neoliberal mode of functioning, that shapes public action "to the criteria of rentability and productivity" (DARDOT; LAVAL, 2016, p. 379), besides promoting the

[…] symbolic depreciation of the law as an act from the legislative power, strengthening the Executive, […] Tendency of powers of police to exempt themselves from all the judicial control, promotion of citizen-consumer in charge of controlling between concurrent political offers […] (DAR-DOT; LAVAL, 2016, p. 379-380).

In place of the symbolic principles that anchored citizenship, there is instituted a condominium management of society nowadays.

The confrontation of neoliberalism, however, cannot be done how it used to be, from a critic of ideology. If ideology was then understood as a false conscience, today, in times of cynism (according to SAFATLE, 2008), it is not possible anymore to think about scraping off a layer of meaning of discourses to point them as fake or improbable. To the question "what means to offer critic", Butler goes to Foucault to build her answer: The critic cannot be directed in blocks to the world, but to practices, discourses, epistemes and institutions, and "it loses its characters in the moment it is abstracted from its operation and made to support itself on its own as a purely generalizable practice (BUTLER, 2004, p. 304). Critic is as a compass with a LED light on the tip, glued in concrete practices, in disputes and conflicts around the world; It aims at allowing that we wall among antagonisms, in the shadow of the forest, illuminating at each step the contexts of interaction and conflict.   It does not illuminate the fighting arena from above, but rather it walks with us. It only maps some centimeters ahead and goes practically materializing the route, announcing when the body loses balance how to give the next step. The critic is situated from the body, although it builds from processes of evental truths.

However, the metaphor of the language flashlight does not precisely comprise the critic, because there is a game between determination and indetermination in this antagonist walk that demands that we walk many times in the dark and we orient ourselves in and from situations of indetermination; the actor is in the middle of this game, but there is not a mark of eternal truths to distinguish real shadows from fake ones. Communication is not a parliamentary activity of consensus. The argument

given at every step and the truth anchored on the events and the subjects affiliated to them. Against these truths subjects are placed in discourses linked to hegemonic devices.

If the neoliberal world locates the source of suffering in the lack of productive experiences of determination (the citizen as self-entrepreneur of himself), we will bet in the non-identity experiences. A theory of recognition in this route should try to incorporate experiences of indetermination, or, as Viveiros de Castro (2002) would say, a Amerindian encounter in the forest. The keyword here is, according to Dunker (2015, p. 299), expansion of indetermination.

This way, as Foucault (in BUTLER, 2004) said, critic must not be built as a general judgement. To make criticism as a form of praxis, Butler says, it is necessary to apprehend "the ways which the own categories are instituted", i. e., how the field of knowledge is built and how "something he suppresses comes back as his own constitutive occlusion" (BUTLER, 2004, p. 304) How the field of knowledge in which we are operating, fighting, combating other discourses is constructed? How our active insertion works amidst the discourses "regarding its abilities of reaching goals" (BUTLER; SALIH, 2004, p. 304)?

Language in Butler is thought in a performative mode, in which saying, thinking and inscribing means to change rules, convince, change epistemic fields, forms of management and biopowers. We live a time where the powers are oriented to manage and control life, populations. It is not about building normative ethics, but supporting criticism towards the decrease of subjugation, subordination, of acting when the concrete modes of existence are seen in danger. This performance is political and not condominium management, that Rancière (1996) calls police. In this perspective, the main task is not to evaluate if their objects are good or bad, valued or not, but "to highlight the own structure of evaluation" (BUTLER, 2004). Butler asks: "what is the relation of our knowledge to power, in a way that our epistemologic certainties support a way of structuring the world that suppresses alternative possibilities of ordenation"? (BUTLER, 2004, . 307).

I would like to link this idea of criticism and de-subjugation with Badiou's perpective. Badiou starts his book Logics of the worlds differentiating democratic materialism from materialistic dialectic. Our most spontaneous current belief is the following: "there is nothing more than bodies and languages". It is the spontaneous belief of democratic or post-modern materialism. In it, "the body is the only concrete instance of the productive individuals that aspire joy. The man, in the regimen of "life potency" is a converted animal that the law of body take over the secret of his hope" (BADIOU, 2008, p. 18). This materialism is a "biomaterialism" that expands animality, because the rights of man are the rights of the living; it is a democratic materialism, because the contemporary consensus, when recognizing the plurality of languages, supposes its juridic equality" (BADIOU, 2008, p. 18). This is the multicultural logic of the globalized capitalism, heiress of the post-modernism. Against this position, Badiou proposes a "materialistic dialectic" in which a third term arises to complement the reality of bodies and languages. This would be the statement of materialistic dialectic: "there is nothing more than bodies and languages, except truths". Having truths makes an objection to the statement of the democratic materialism: Truths are not bodies or languages, but "incorporeal bodies, languages without meaning, generic infinites, unconditional supplements" (BADIOU, 2008, p. 20). This "but" indicates that it is not about adding truths to bodies and languages or dialectic synthesis. "The truths exist as an exception of what it is" (BADIOU, 2008, p. 21). Truths are not only adequate correspondences between been object/state of things and statements. They appear as processes that modify the states of things from events.

How does this process actually start? It starts with the emergency of an act (so-called event) that break the state of things, re-shuffles the way which the set of elements that characterize a state of representation is organized, that is, the frames of order and separation. The liberal state places law and order to protect power and wealth. From the subjects of the neoliberal system the self-entrepreneur growth is expected, in which every one prepares to raise their "me" capital, adding characteristics and

attributes. In this perspective, Badiou says, the law is the prescription of a reasonable order for this situation, for this type of conjunction, of setting of elements into sets. Some sets are considered existent, visible, others are not. To these last ones, the system sends tear gas, anti-depressants, prison or the mist of invisibility. For the people that are not from the "elite", the world is not liquid, but it is rather solid. The accepted and appropriate parts of condominiums get a title of self-entrepreneurs and the others remain without name and without place. The law is, therefore, a decision about the existence, which gives an ontological character to the law of order in this state of things (BADIOU, 2012, p. 67).

In search of the recognition

The main fights against capitalism had been of economic redistribution until the 70's, when the opposition faced was of economic status: On one side, the work force, on the other, the capital. But, since then, the proletariat stopped being one only universal subject that once unified the "multiplicity of social manifestations aiming political emancipation" (SAFATLE, 2015, p. 325). Starting in the 60's and 70's, the "new social movements" had emerged, with the feminist, gay, ethnic, post-national fights, etc. With this, the confrontations had dislocated from a politics of classes to a politics of identities.

In the 90's, social theory, in the trend of these so-called "new" movements, started reinventing the theory of multiplicities following new bases. This did not occur only due to the nature of demands, but from, as Safatle says (2015), reader of Boltanski and Chiapelo (2009), of changes in ethos of capitalism after 1968. With that, the centrality of the concept of fight of classes falls and rises the shout for recognition "as a central political device" (SAFATLE, 2015, p. 326).

Some authors, as Axel Honneth (2003), affirm that all fight must be thought as recognition fight. Nancy Fraser does not agree with this and invite us to think of the injustices as economic redistribution and cultural recognition (FRASER; HONNETH, 2006).

My general thesis is that, nowadays, justice demands both redistribution and recognition. Separately none of the two is enough. However, when we embrace this thesis, the question of how they match both aspects asks maximum importance. I maintain that they have to integrate in one only global mark the aspects that emancipate both issues. From a theoretical point of view, the task consists in ideate a bidimensional conception of justice that can integrate both defensible vindications of social equality and recognition of difference. In fact, the task consists in ideate a programmatic political orientation that can integrate the best of the redistribution politics with the best of the recognition politics (FRASER; HONNETH, 2006, p. 19).

According to Honneth, even the redistribution injustices, from the field of economy, should be understood as unattended demands of recognition, as social demonstrations of disrespect.

The motivation of social protest for the poor layers of society is not based on the orientation of moral principles positively formulated, but rather on the experience of violation of ideas of justice given intuitively; the normative nucleus of these ideas of justice consists one and other time in expectations related with respect or even dignity, honor and integrity. Well, if they generalize these results beyond their respective contexts of investigation, the conclusion is to see in the acquisition of social recognition the normative condition of all communicative action (HONNETH, 2011, p. 136).

There is, in the multiculturalism linked to the global capitalism, the illusion of a pluralism without antagonism:

[…] illusion based on the forgetfulness that identities, albeit psychological or political, are always constructed in the interior of symmetrical relations of power, being therefore expressions of strategies of defense or domination (SAFATLE, 2015, p. 349).

Multiculturalism tries to solve this matter through a "politicalization of the cultural differences", building a politicy of tolerance. As Safatle says, this equation of differences comes from the question "How far can we stand the differences?" (SAFATLE, 2015). With that, however, we

remain in the circle of isolated differences, without building extended logics that do not stop at the differences or hold politics merely compensatories to reach a policy that integrates recognition and redistribution, that is, cultural and economic demands, the way Fraser proposed in his polemic with Honneth (FRASER considered; HONNETH, 2006).

In this sense, multiculturalism is a complement of neoliberalism, to which there is only an individual competing against the others. Safatle invite us to think about politics outside this conjunction between economy and culture:

> […]politics is, above all, a force of de-differentiation capable of opening a productive field of indetermination to the subjects. Political subjects are not holders of individual demands that represent particular groups, statements and classes (SAFATLE, 2015, p. 354).

Therefore, the combat against biopowers must invest in the direction of the indetermination and a change of the circuit of the affection in order to create movements/events that are not anchored in the individual conquests. In this direction, we must think of communication from the scenes of honnethian conflict, not on a parliament that seek habermasian consensus.

In Laclau, the movement for the construction of people can only exist from a lack, a breach that emerges in the apparent continuity of social issues. There is projected an absent plenitude. "The construction of people would be the attempt of giving a name to this absent fullness" (LACLAU, 2013, p. 140). The lack would linked to a demand that was not answered by the powers in effect. There is placed a fracture between the unanswered demands and the powers that did not answer them. The demand does not need to be something as the price it wheat, it can be more abstract, as the attendance to the rights of the citizen, of the woman, homosexual, of trans people. That is, in Laclau, the movement cannot be purely anarchic, having to sew the differences through a equivalencial logic that is opposed to the hegemonic discourses.

Politics has to, therefore, be evental in the sense it has to undo the modes of order of visible, legible and representable, and this is not of

the order of the strictly individual development. As we said with Badiou, it is necessary to undo the law in these ways of order, of naming things, of elements that belong to representable, visible, correspondent sets to descriptions known as clear and distinct, recognizable. The event modifies the states of things of the worlds, introducing the possibility of new processes of truths since that it has citizens faithful to the event. Badiou defines desire as the search of something beyond the normality of the law, desire as "singularity". It is in this sense that we talk about evental politics, that can initiate a new communicational process.

Occupying the square, inventing the public

Let us consider the example of the Occupy movements, as in Wall Street (OWS), that took over north American cities in 2011 and 2012. They started with meetings with few dozens of activists and expanded until gathered thousands of participants. The idea was to promote a horizontal activism that would not be subordinate to old strategies of traditional movements linked to labor unions and parties; the movement intended to occupy a square nearby the stock exchange and call horizontal activists to the place. It was necessary to have initial proposals to contaminate other people and to extend the movement. The initial idea for the convocation came from David Graeber: The wealthiest 1% of the population not only concentrated the country's wealth, but they transformed this wealth into political power (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 57). As Joseph Stiglitz said,

> […] practically all the American senators and most members of the house of representatives, when they arrive at the Chamber, belong to the wealthiest one percent, are kept in the power by the money of the richer one percent and know that, if they serve well to this one percent, they will be rewarded when they leave the position (STIGLITZ in GRAEBER, 2015, p. 57).

There came the idea of calling the Occupy Wall Street action of "movement of the 99%". The activists wanted to leave from what was

already been done in the squares of Cairo, Athens, Barcelona and Madrid, "where thousands of common citizens, most of them with no preparation in terms of political mobilization, were willing to occupy public squares in protest against all the political class of their country (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 58). The Occupy decided to adopt the non-violent practice of Gandhi, even though it failed in previous movements - as it was the case of forest defenders in the 90's, that were tortured by the police without the attention of the media; moreover, "the local tribunals deemed acceptable the tactic of applying pepper spray on protester's eyes. Without any media coverage or legal appeal, the contradictions that Gandhi's tactics should unveil were simply lost" (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 76). In the case of Occupy, such tactics worked, because media gave attention to the movement following the trend of international repercussion. Beyond this change of focus from the media, Graeber attributes the spread of news and videos to the social media activity, although, he says, it does not explain why the movement spread so quickly throughout the country (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 80). Here the feeling of "shame, dishonor and strong indignation for hearing one's a loser in a game that no one made him play" (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 81) counts. Graeber tells the story of a lady who:

> Even though she came from a modest household, she got to go to a PhD in Renaissance Literature in an Ivy League institution. The result? She had an 80-thousand dollar debt and no immediate perspective except working as an assistant, which would not even cover the rent, much less her college tuition (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 82).

Would Occupy have been an event when bringing to the square a set of people and groups very different from each other who gathered their fight against neoliberalism through an equivalency logic (LACLAU, 2015)? This is a hard discussion to establish, but we can consider that this anarchist movement puts in question something very important in these neoliberal times: democracy is not something defined by the vote of the majority, but rather "the process of collective deliberation under the principle of full and equal participation" (GRAEBER, 2015, p. 187).

In this sense, people gathered in the square to deliberate constitute an event for democracy, because they make this experience a common one. Facing this event, the constituted powers strongly react. The experience of democracy does not appear, therefore, from within a politically instituted system, but it comes of the world of life, of these experiences that suspend the hegemonic discourse (the neoliberal speech, the speech that says there is no other way of living except under the capitalist regime, etc.). We are not talking about ideals. The question is: How can radical democracy speeches be built outside the corrupted circuits of the traditional system? To build equivalential coalisions that gather differences to create a counter-hegemonic movement is not enough, because in order to govern it would be necessary to get into a machine of governability that is already corrupted. Thus, the most basic sense of anarchism – a government "without rulers" – is what really matters here, and not the romantic ideal of a communitarianism without leaders. This "non government evokes a certain political sensibility that proposes a set of relations that do not appeal to force and violence to be imposed. As Graeber says, "the ends will never be reached unless the means are, themselves, a model of the world one wants to create" (GRAEBER, 2015). We cannot negotiate with outlaws if we want to change the ways of governability and sociability.

Bodies in alliance and the politics of the streets

Butler, in an article during the protests post-2010, as for example in the Tahir square, talks about all these experiences of being together:

> […] those in the winter of 2011 against tyrannical regimes in northern Africa and in the Middle East, but also against the increasing deficit of the workers in Europe and in the southern hemisphere, the fights for public education throughout U.S.A. and Europe, and those fights to create a more safe street for women, sexual and gender minorities and, including trans people, whose public visibility is frequently punished with legal and illegal violence (BUTLER, 2011).

According to the authors, the bodies congregated in movement, in talk, claiming a public space. The bodies did not enter a public space that was already given beforehand, already institutionalized, because the public character of the space is already a part of the dispute. This public which is built by the movement in the square is performative in so far as where he constitutes it when we name it an act. The police, when it assaults the protesters, is refusing this perspective of the movement. It supports a neoliberal public who, in fact, is not public, but an individualistic space. The police cannot be thought of as an activity exclusive from a public sphere, says Butler, because "it always crosses this line and again, bringing attention to the way which this politics is already in the house, on the street or in the neighbourhood, or even in these virtual spaces that are not linked to the architecture of the public square" (BUTLER, 2011).

What it means, then, to gather in a multitude, contesting the distinction between public and private? This meeting, this gathering of people, of singularities that cannot respond to the univocal sovereignty, is the public demand, in a way it produces, by their own doing, the public of this gathering, refusing the regimes of instauration of a fixed visibility, an interaction and a governability previously supported by the power of the police. Evental communication is precisely the process of this gathering demanding performatively the public. The gathering is the own evental reconfiguration (intensivity) of the environment, of the material which constitutes the surroundings and the basis of this meeting (the street, the square). There is no collective action without these materials. When trucks become platforms for speech of participants of the multitude or when the human microphones repeat the speeches so that it can be heard by everyone, this is the materialization of this gathering, the effect of the bodies in junction. The action depends not only on the multitude, but on the material supports and the interventions performed at any moment. When we make effective the actions from the multitude, there is a fight in act over what really constitutes and about what will be the public space (while it is made while being), but also about

"the basic modes in which we are, as bodies, supported in the world – a fight against the deprivation of rights and abandonment", against the deficit of life (BUTLER, 2011).

The public space is not only the material support given by the streets and squares, but it appears, in the meeting of the bodies, as a space for visibility and interaction. Butler speaks of a "space to appear" that appears among the participants - in presence, as the semiotic scholars would say - when the alliance is made, in the measure where the alliance is being made, in the gerund of the action - communication in presence. When appearing for the other, in this gerund of finding in the bodies of the square, the bodies are not there as naked lives, but as political bodies in a space of plural action. The action creates the location, because it does not come from a place that previously support the action: this place created in act is part of the dispute. In this sense, the in public is performative. In the act of enunciate it, materialize it, in the interaction itself, the bodies create it. The discourse arises in so far as the bodies gather and act.

> To rethink the space of appearance (or visibility) in order to understand the power and the effect of public demonstration of our time, we need to understand the body dimensions of actions, in which the body requires and what the body could do, specially when we should think about the bodies together, what makes them be together, their conditions of persistence and power (BUTLER, 2011).

These alliances can, as Butler said, acquire performative power, in an anarchist moment, against tyrannical regimes (the case of Egypt, for example, in 2011), against the debt of students and workers from the United States, against the deficit of life, in the search of a better place to live, free pass for national transportations, security for women on the streets or respect regarding sexual orientation of minorities (BUTLER, 2011). It is a recess where you question power, government, make demands that are still not codified under the law. What interest us here is this evental dimension of acting together, gathered, that "open time

and space and outside the temporality and the established architecture of the regime" and which can reset what is public.

For the politics to have a place, the body should appear. A body appears for the others, having a space between bodies that allow these appearances. That does not only create a visibility, but an audience, because voices circulate.

> What we are, corporally, is already a way of being "for" the other, appearing in a way we cannot see, being a body for the other in a way that I cannot be for myself, and thus, dispossessed, in perspective, by our own sociability (BUTLER, 2011).

I must appear for others in ways "for which I cannot give an account and in this way my body establishes a perspective that I cannot inhabit". The body establishes not only my own perspective, Butler says, but it dislocates this perspective and turns this displacement into a necessity.

> This happens more clearly when we think about bodies that act together. No body establishes the space of appearance, but this action, this performative exercise only occurs "between" two bodies, in a space that constitutes the gap between my body and of the other. That way, my body, when it acts politically, does not act alone. In fact, the action emerged from the "in between" (BUTLER, 2011).

Speech and uprising

With the event, the differences can emerge in a meeting at a square and make the creation of an equivalential logic (term by LACLAU, 1996). After the event, however, a new antagonist field is created, in which there are many types of subjects regarding the event: Those loyal to the event, those who go, from it, build a world in politics, in arts, in science or in love, but there are also reactive subjects, the ones who refuse the event. These reactive subjects in general are linked to the power of the police. In this new field, many speeches challenge the senses of the event, making a decrease in the maximum intensity of evental eruption,

in a way that the first moment of maximum affection make way to the legibility of the event, that gradually arise, in so far as the senses are being built by the speeches in challenge. In order for that disputes develop towards radical democracy, it is necessary that the left expand "the chains of equivalence between the different fights against oppression" (LACLAU; MOUFFE, 2015, p. 264).

In order for it to develop, it is necessary to understand the discourse theory not as an instrument only for reading texts, but as a criticism in the sense that Butler and Foucault say, i. e., as an utility belt for reading practices and devices, including networks that constitute these devices: legislations, decrees, laws, institutions, practices, regulations, etc. The discourse theory should act in act in the gathering of differences that put us to think, together, new worlds. In this sense, it is not a theory, it is a praxis.

We come, therefore, to some conclusions that are necessary for the understanding of a communication theory and a discourse theory that are not only exam for verbal, visual or verbivisual texts, but also practices linked to the ways of functioning biopotences in their fight against biopowers. This theory is anchored in a Foucault who read Butler and Laclau. Let's see: In Foucault, it was about, for example, in the history of sexuality, of understanding how the experience of sexuality is developed in the individuals, which takes them to "recognize themselves as subjects of a sexuality" (FOUCAULT, 2009, p. 10). Experience, for him, means "the correlation, in a culture, between fields of knowledge, types of normativity and forms of subjectivity". Thus, to make a history of sexuality is not to understand its successive forms in the time as effects of forms of repression, because this would put "desire and the subject of desire outside of the historical field" (FOUCAULT, 2009).

In summary, the general form of inderdition cannot comprise what is historical in sexuality, the same way as, in Butler, the subject cannot be understood only if we consider its subordination to the norms, but it is always important to think about the space of agency, of creativity that allows him to de-subordinate and open field for events. To give account of this history, it is necessary to face three axes, as Foucault says:

A. the formation of knowledge linked to the sexuality;

B. the systems of power that regulate its practice;

C. the forms for which the individuals are recognized as subjects of this sexuality (FOUCAULT, 2009).

Here comes the theory of discourse as an analysis of practices linked to the device of sexuality, i. e., a network constituted by regulations, laws, norms, decrees, documents, institutions, professional formation linked to this field, etc. With that it is possible, in particular, to examine how the formation of knowledge come to be, "escaping the dilemma between science and ideology" (FOUCAULT, 2009, p. 11), but, at the same time, it is necessary to undertake the analysis of power relations and its technologies "escaping the alternative between a power conceived as domination or denounced as a simulation" (FOUCAULT, 2009, p. 11). Regarding the last item, the recognition of the individual as a subject of desire, Foucault invite us to undertake a genealogy; it is about

> […] analyzing practices through those the individuals were led to pay attention to themselves, to decipher themselves, to recognize and confess themselves as subjects of desire, establishing by yourself a certain relationship that allows to discover, in the desire, the truth of your being, either natural or decayed. [...] In summary, to understand how the modern individual could make the experience of himself as a subject of a "sexuality", it would be indispensable to previously distinguish the way for which, during centuries, the western man is led if to recognize as subject of desire (FOUCAULT, 2009, p. 12).

With this, we see that politics is this intervention of the bodies battling in this performative perspective in search of lines of escape of the hegemonic speeches. To have politics it is necessary to have event and, for this, anarchic bodies, even if it only happens in the moment of maximum intensity of events. We can think that the speaker/agent, when entering the culture, is being affectionally marked in his body, making his choices and, in the same way, being chosen by the discourses and the affectional constellations invested in him. There is, therefore, a tendency of cristalizing affection and discourses in bodies through discipline,

control and pedagogy linked to systemic devices. The body is, in this manner, marked by words, by speeches. Many speeches try to comprise what occurs in a field from diverse positions of subjects, with their desires, interests and demands. This fight of position does not involve only arguments, but practices rooted in values incarnated in affected bodies, that is, the dominant values also incarnate in bodies that do not only act cognitively, but affectively. That works for discursive disputes in the most different themes, such as sustainability, entrepreneurship and populism. These affections are rooted, incorporated, incarnated ever since that the baby sucked in his mother's chest or since he was in her belly, listening and feeling the world around. The learning of the language is corporal and there is no pre-discursive subject. The body supports many subjects and they respond to speeches and practices. The subject is effect of a speech: On one side, as in Foucault, the subject is subjugated to the speeches in which he is constituted; on another, he is capable of agency, as in Butler, being able to carry through subversion. This subjection was marked in the body by a negativist language, from whose negativation had emerged pulsions.

The semiotics of passion speaks in a protensive subject, which implies to imagine a subject pre-conscience, dived into the magma of the Lebenswelt, of the world of life with its atematical forms, semantic and pragmatic, species of fenomenological unconscious where dasein drinks to produce his speeches, that, by the way, as Greimas would say, has his perfumes. The protensive subject is not only dived into these evental perfumes of the world of life, because there are shades in this world. It is a world filled with affection, because the forms of wording and feeling the states of things, the subjective and social states are not inaffected. The world of life (Lebenswelt) is a filling of languages loaded with affection. This experience that is born through the tree of the world of the life is not monologically generated by the individual conscience, but rather it is a communicative corporeal living in so far as dasein gets into the language, the collective, being family the first of them. It is in the relation with the other, since early times, since the mother gives the

baby her chest, that the baby-dasein is sucked within the language, in the same way that he sucks the chest when he feeds, learning that food is mother and it is affection. To feed oneself is, since the beginning, to affect by and from the other; or, as Lacan says, it involves the pleasure of the mouth, which takes us from the hierarchy of necessities of Maslow.

There are two levels of these discursive readings:

1. Foucaultian-butlerian, that is in localizing the historical series of statements that constitute the force of the device to be studied (for example, the psychiatric device, neoliberalism, etc.);
2. analysis of texts (including practices) involved in the functioning of the device in question in each case.

It is necessary to remember that the affectivity does not operate only through speeches, but also through the events. Moreover, the circuit of affection is closely related to the disputes of senses of events, when the speeches and the devices come into dispute in order to illuminate the first. The speeches are affected by the affection and reach the bodies - that is, they are become incorporated, they get incarnated.

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