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O autômato digital e os circuitos de afetos nas redes sociais: uma análise do conceito de autômato espiritual no Imagem-Tempo de Deleuze e seus desdobramentos nas interfaces digitais

The digital automaton and the circuits of affects in social networks: an analysis of the concept of a spiritual automaton in Deleuze's Image-Time and its unfolding in digital interfaces

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Resumo: *O presente artigo investiga a relação entre o conceito de autômato espiritual, tal como desenvolvido por G. Deleuze em seu texto sobre o cinema, Imagem-Tempo, e os autômatos digitais que emergem nas redes sociais de nossa atualidade. Conceitos como autômato psicológico, automovimento do pensamento, escolha e sugestão, padrão de comportamento e perfil de usuário são explorados para compreender a atual relação que mantemos com as interfaces digitais, de modo a explicitar os novos processos de pensamento e afetos em jogo nas redes sociais.*

Palavras-chave: *redes sociais; autômato espiritual; autômato digital; padrão de comportamento; processo de decisão.*

Abstract: *This article investigates the relationship between the concept of spiritual automaton, as developed by G. Deleuze in his text on the cinema, Image-Time, and the digital automata that appear in the social networks of our times. Concepts such as psychological automaton, self-movement of thought, choice and suggestion, behavior pattern and user profile are explored to understand the current relationship that we maintain with the digital interfaces, in*

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order to make explicit the new thinking and affects processes that emerge from social networks.

Keywords: *social networks; spiritual automaton; digital automaton; behavior pattern; decision-making process.*

Introduction

The present article investigates the relationship between the concept of spiritual automaton, as developed by G. Deleuze in his text about cinema, Image-Time, and the digital automata that appear on social networks of our times. It is evident that the power of capturing the attention that the universe of digital interfaces has over people. Just like cinema keeps having its magic on multitudes throughout the world, making people dream and cry with their moving pictures, digital interfaces also act directly over subjectivities, precipitating them onto labyrinths of their space-information. But what we discuss here goes beyond this capture, because what it seems to be at stake in the space-information, which is deepened with the continuous use of Internet and digital interfaces, is the way they interfere in important processes of the lives of their users. Firstly, because of the massive intensification of virtual consumption, the individuals are submitted to strategies of inducing constant choice and decision. Such induction, which also can be names as incitation, provocation or constraint, results from complex processes of calculations performed by sophisticated algorithms spread throughout the web, that will be referred in this article as *network digital automata*, or simply *digital automata*. Secondly, there would be an unfolding of these consumption inductions, that rebounds now in the affection level of social network users. It's about processes of estimate, present in platforms of social interaction, that mesh their participants in a continuous process of evaluation of themselves and others. We call that affection automaton, which characterizes the affectionate automatism with they react the individuals that frequent such platforms and chain them into an emotional circuit, induced, equally, by algorithms of personalization.

The spiritual automaton in cinema

In the chapter titled "Thought and cinema" of his book Image-Time, Deleuze understands that, with the arrival of the cinematograph, it is attained the self-movement or automatic movement within the artwork.

Movement becomes the immediate data of image, unlike the universe of painting, which would be the spirit who reconstitute them, or theatre, where movement depends of a medium, in this case, the actor, that performs it. In the cinematographic dominion, it is the image itself that moves in itself. This luminous self-movement makes Deleuze go further into the idea of emergency, in the mind of the viewer, of a spiritual automaton, as a type of effect in the brain resulting from the movie projection: "the *automatic movement* made a *spiritual automaton* in us, which, in turn, reacts about it" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 189). Such idea would be present, in an embryonic form, in the texts of Élie Faure, renowned French art historian, in the beginning of the 20th century, quoted by Deleuze, who would be one of the firsts to correlate the automatic movement of images in the cinema with the own movement of thought:

> In fact, it is their own material automatism that creates inside these images the new universe that, little by little, it imposes to our intellectual automatism. That is how it appears, in a dazzling light, the subordination of the human soul to the instruments created by them, reciprocally. (E. FAURE, 1934, p. 9)

In turn, the writer Raymond Bellour, renowned for his analysis on cinema, establishes a correlation between the experiences at the moment the cinema was created and hypnosis in its beginnings, having as a base the fact that both explores the effects of repetition on the conscience of a viewer in alert immobility (BELLOUR, 2009). More recently, authors such as Andriopoulos (2014) and Eugeni (2002) also explore the relationship between cinema and hypnosis. In a similar manner, Deleuze understands that movie directors in the beginning of the 20th century, such as Vertov, Abel Gance and Eisenstein, advocated a form of direct action of the cinematographic image-movement over thought, such as a shock capable of communicating "vibrations to the cortex, touching directly the nervous and cerebral system" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 190). In other words, the conception of *spiritual automaton* would be linked here with the automatic movement of images, that raise, incite in the viewer a mental automaton. It is an automatic movement that acts directly over

the brain, by vibrations. The automaton constituted by that reacts, in turn, over the automatism of images.

Occurs that the concept of spiritual automaton had already been employed, and for the first time, by Espinosa and Leibniz in the 17th century. He expressed, at that moment, the experience you have when you exercise the logical thinking, formally deducing thoughts of others. When we think, according to Espinosa, we only obey the laws of thought, which allow ideas to link themselves in an autonomous way, working as causes one in relation to the other, that give the activity of thinking the dimension of an authentical spiritual automaton (ESPINOSA, 2003, p. 85). It is about the experience of movement in the thought itself, concatenating ideas in an automatic form, depending only of their own concepts to go through the following concepts. Therefore, the meaning of automaton here includes the notion of self-movement, which is attributed to thought in its activity.

The interesting part in Deleuze's thought is that he, from the notion of spiritual automaton thought by Espinosa, concludes about a new form of automatism, which arise from the effects of cinematographic images about thoughts. In this case, there would be an essential difference in relation to the spiritual automaton of the classic philosophy, because this last one would point towards a mere logical or abstract possibility of formally deducing thoughts from one another, while in the case of the cinema's spiritual automaton, it is established a circuit that links thoughts directly with the cinematographic image-movement. The automaton would be, in this sense, "the common power of what is forced to think and what is thought under mental shock" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 190).

But is necessary to make justice to Espinosa's philosophy and remember that the theory of imagination also understood a triggering process of images in the mind through signs of the world, which gave the flow of imagination this automatic character of chain.

> In effect, a soldier, for instance, when seeing the traces of a horse over sand, will immediately go through the thought of the hose for the thought of the knight, and, then, for the thought of the war, etc. A farmer, on the other hand, will go from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, of the field, etc. And, thus, each one, depending on how he was accustomed to link and concatenate images of things, will go from a certain thought to another. (ESPINOSA, 2007, II,18, sc.)

In this example, from indicial stimuli, the spiritual automaton articulates a sequence of thoughts that come from their own habits, as suggested by Espinosa. In the case of cinema, the idea of Deleuze is that the experience of image-movement induces the concatenation of thoughts, according to the own organization of cinematographic montage. It is this fact that stimulates the first big movie directors to believe they would be facing an art that, finally, would promote an authentic social revolution: "Everything goes through as if the cinema would say: with me, with the image-movement, you can no longer escape the shock that awakes the thought in you. A subjective and collective automaton for an automatic movement: the art of *masses*" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 190). That would be the vision of Eisenstein, which defended that the cinema would produce a shock that forces the thought, imposing this shock to the masses, creating a people subject of their actions (EISENSTEIN, 1976). And this power created would reside in the core of the cinematographic montage, which would enter in circuit with the thought, inducing the intellectual process of thinking of a "whole" that surpasses the film, which gathers the parts overcoming them into a product of superior order, in a concept that overflies the film itself and gives it a bigger meaning.

There are two criticisms to highlight in this reading of the spiritual automaton associated to the classic cinema. The first is about the romantism of the first filmmakers, who believed in the revolutionary force of the cinematographic art. Everyone knows that, as Deleuze observes,

> If an art necessarily imposed the shock or the vibration, the world would have changed a long time ago, and a long time ago men would think. That is why this pretention of cinema, at least in their grand pioneers, is nowadays something to smile about (…) All hope put into cinema, the art of masses and the new thought, now seem declarations in a museum. (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 190)

To this first criticism is added a second one, which points out that cinema, precisely, has a potential of widening daily banalities. Commercial actions, sex and violence begin to occupy a new form of industrial art, and the spiritual automaton becomes a puppet of propaganda. Deleuze attributes that, partly, to the fact that the cinema is a product of techniques of reproduction in scale, proliferating a "quantitative mediocrity". However, behind that factor, something more terrible is outlined, the manipulation of the masses by the fascism of the State, in mention of Nazi propaganda in Second World War period. "The spiritual automaton made men fascists", says Deleuze, pointing towards mass human manipulations as a synonym of the grand crisis of cinema, when Hitler was a rival to Hollywood2.

The crisis of the post-war cinema and the arrival of the world of information

The cinema crisis, according to Deleuze, will be associated to the period of fascist propaganda, but equally to the post-war world, which ends up promoting a rupture of the more conventional action films. With the Italian neorealism, for example, cinema seems to abandon their aspiration to action narratives, that would get the viewer's attention with the same question: what is going to happen? The breach of narrative comes followed by this unsettling sensation that nothing happens, which ends up bringing up the thought in a type of zigzag or spiral, remitting the spiritual automaton to the pure effort of thinking and understanding: what is happening? What has happened? The contradictory images that the

2 Deleuze refers to the german filmaker Leni Riefenstahl, renowned by her films of propaganda for the German Nazi Party. (Deleuze,2005, p. 199)

post-war cinema builds are a dissociative force, not the power of linking images according to an interior monologue, but linking them according to multiple voices, always a voice inside a voice. Deleuze brings up Artaud, which said about the cinema that "the thought can only think the fact that we still didn't think about, the impotence both for thinking the whole as to think about oneself, being the thought always petrified, dislocated, tumbled (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 203). The new montages, with the introduction of the fake raccord, for example, lead to the inexistence of a whole that can be thought of. Thus, the spiritual automaton won't be the one with the classical logical thought, nor the one who gets in circuit with the automatic image, but rather "the Mummy, dismounted instance, paralyzed, petrified, frozen, which documents the impossibility of thinking about the thought" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 201). On the other hand, this paralysis, this impotence only mark the leap of thought, which is forced to get out the pre-stablished circuits of action-reaction of the classic cinema, is induced to disconnect to the common sense to directly face with the dissociative and multiple power of the modern cinema. The mark of experience of image-time in the spiritual automaton will be so grand, that Deleuze understands it being the main characteristic of the cinematographic art in the second half of the 20th century.

What happens is that in the mid-1980's it were already in course a technological and social evolution of automata. In that occasion, Deleuze already noticed that the computing automatons were already arriving. It was a change of nature, because along with the movement automata, such as pendula, clocks and engines, and also the cinema, emerged the data and information manipulation machine, which worked as automata of calculus and thought, regulation and *feedback*. The movement automaton, which represents the cinema, ended up promoting the automatization of the masses, with this phenomenon of the boss as the big spiritual automaton, or as a filmmaker Hitler. But Deleuze realized that, with the computing automaton, everything seems to be diluted "into a network of information, where 'deliberators' managed regulation, treatment, storage, through the intercrosses of insomniacs and mediums"

(DELEUZE, 2005, p. 314). To the eyes of today, we must recognize that Deleuze had a very clear vision of the future, because the computing context of the 1980's was only in their beginning. It is surprising how, at that moment, his understanding on digital images already sounded extremely current:

> The modern figure of the automaton is the correlation of an electronic automatism. (The birthing digital image) does not have exteriority (extra field) nor interiorize them into a whole: they have a right and a wrong, reversible and not passive of superposition, as a power of turning over oneselves. They are an object of perpetual reorganization, in which a new image can be born from any point of the previous image. The screen space becomes omnidirectional, where angles and coordinates always vary. (The screen constitutes now a space-information), an opaque surface over which 'data' is inscribed, with information replacing Nature, the brain-city, the third eye, replacing the eyes of nature. (...) The new spiritual automatism refers, in turn, to the new psychological automata. (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 315)

This passage could well refer to today's smartphones, this "opaque surface over which data is inscribed", a *black mirror* involving thought in its space-information, with images that can form through any point. Deleuze also notes that the vertical screen position begins to have an absolutely conventional meaning, because what we see in it are information, not the world in movement, like in the cinema, so it can then be disposed horizontally or in any other position. Probably influenced by the impact of television and video, Deleuze glimpses that the modern world is the one in which information replaces nature, becoming a big media-effect, where a brain-information or brain-city replaces the eye-nature of the cinema: when the screen is a space-information, "the image doesn't stop sliding to other images in an infinite profusion of messages, and the own plan looks less like an eye than an overloaded brain that incessantly absorbs information" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 317)

Another important aspect that emerges from the concept of screen as a space-information is the modification of the relation with the whole. The computing automaton constantly promotes a disjunction between

image, sound and text, in a way they do not align more according to a conventional process of representation. What we see does not necessarily adjust to what is heard or what is read. It is, according to Deleuze, an "irrational" relation according to dissymmetrical directions, image and sound not reconstituting more as a whole. The whole becomes impossible, because the complexity of the space-information is "non-totalizable, 'non-representable by one only individual', which only finds representation in the automaton" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 319).

The Internet and the dream of a Collective Intelligence

With the consolidation of the Internet, this computing automaton from the 1980's which Deleuze refers to, associated to the power of calculation, storage and information processing, gave place to a collective digital automaton, that began to distribute information in network and promoting a global communication. In this sense, the expectation that began in the first decades of the classic cinema, of promoting the revolution of masses, wouldn't also be fed in relation to the new digital media? It is important to remember that even before the Internet was globally consolidated, in the 1990's, there already were arising strongly the first virtual communities. They quickly expanded and made us believe that something like a collective intelligence would be possible, giving the possibility of people communicating amongst themselves anywhere in the planet, exchanging information and knowledge3. One can say that this period fed the romantic phase of the flourishing cyberculture, period where renowned authors wrote about the new possibilities of expansion of civilization, of anthropological mutation, where ideas could circulate freely and generate innovations anywhere. Impacts on forms of government, for instance, such as the proposition of a direct democracy and de-centralized management, were defended by the most optimists with the newborn Web. Changes in lifestyle, with the emergence of a mul-

3 The Community The Well (significando Whole Earth 'lectronic Link) was the name given to the first virtual community founded in 1985 by the editors of the magazine Whole Earth Review.

ticultural production, were predictions that fed academic and mediatic discussions, beyond, of course, the effects on the methods of education in general. Among these authors, we can quote Pierre Lévy and Howard Rheingold, for example, considered intellectuals that mobilized the debate on cyberculture and collective intelligence throughout the 1990's and in the beginning of the 2000's. As Pierre Lévy believed, in 1994:

> The instruments of communication and collective thinking will no longer be reinvented without reinventing the democracy, a democracy distributed everywhere, active, molecular. In this dangerous turning point or ending point, humanity could take the power back of their future. Not delivering their fate in the hands of a supposedly intelligent mechanism, but systematically producing tools that will allow them to constitute in intelligent collectives (…). (LÉVY, 1998, p. 15)

In this affirmation made by Lévy, one can already perceive both tendencies in confrontation at that moment: a supposedly intelligent mechanism that would control humanity's fate, or the bet in intelligent collectives that would reinvent democracy. With the advance of technologies of global communication, the collective digital automaton, operating connected through the internet, already was born inside this dilemma, which seems that define it even today: being at service of control mechanism or working to a collective intelligence. Howard Rheingold also believed in the potential of connection between people through the Internet, defending that the best search mechanism was still the direct contact between people that had the information: "Due to the fact that so many members of the virtual communities perform professions based on proper knowledge, virtual communities can be practical instruments" (RHEINGOLD, 1996, p. 77). However, despite the expectations of consolidation of a collective intelligence, product of the emerging multimedia and hypermedia space that reorganized sound and visual images, and also the means of access to the space of digital information increasingly more flexible and multiple, doubts already were present in Lévy and in Rheingold about the future of the Internet. Rheingold would ask himself:

> I wonder if the highly lucrative markets of domestic video and television will finance the infrastructure of multilateral communications dreamed by educationalists and activists? Or will everything come down to "pay-per-view", leaving few or no space available to community networks and virtual communities? (RHEINGOLD, 1996, p. 331)

Lévy would also ask himself this kind of question, as when he asks, for instance, if the "infoways" and the "multimedia" wouldn't end up being a supertelevision? Would they be advertising the definitive victory of consumption of merchandise and spectacle? Will they raise the abyss between the rich and the poor, the excluded and the 'well-positioned'? (LÉVY, 1994, p. 13). In addition to these doubts, in the final portion of the 1990's, the ampliation of pornography websites, problems with the electronic commerce, the attacks of hackers, the big amount of trash that came back on search engines at the time, in addition to the numberless cases of harassment in chats frequented by anonym users, we understand the reason which the Internet began to also be seen as an environment of threats and crimes.

It is possible to perceive, than, that the same expectation lived by the first cinematographers, which believed that the cinema would be the art that would impose the shock of thought to the people, was also dreamed by many as a real possibility of the Internet in the beginning, like the participative democracy and the collective intelligence. However, in this flourishing period, critics pointed towards cinema as an art of propaganda, of commercial figurations, of sharing sex, etc. The bad cinema. The same criticism received by the Internet at the end of the 1990's, similar even about the dominion of the masses, thar began to be translated as control of users through intelligent mechanisms. As well as power or capacity of the cinema revealed, for many, as nothing more than pure and simple logical possibility, the same way the question is put on the Internet: its capability or power to engender a real democracy or a collective intelligence wouldn't be only mere technical possibility?

An atmosphere like that wouldn't collaborate with very new enterprises to the eyes of the consumers. It was that way that in the 2000's,

the internet was struck by a serious financial crisis. This crisis happened, mainly, because of the euphoria of the investors in their so-called "dot.com" businesses, as they bet in quick and extraordinary gains that weren't confirmed. Beyond this aspect, another discussion fed business owners at that turn of century: how to make money with businesses on the Internet? The answer to this question came in a double manner: through technology and philosophy.

The digital automaton in social networks

When the discussion on the emergency of the Internet arise 20 years ago, it was already known that the researches on intelligent agents would be essential for the future development of the network. However, it wasn't expected that, throughout these years, they would simply fill all the space of software and apps available today in the market. One can say, in an illustrative sense, that everything began with the studies on how to perfect the assistants of electronic e-mail in the beginning of the 1990's, in a way to improve user experience. This line of technological research would impact the advance of Amazon's collaborative filters, which would begin its activities in 1995, and the solutions of Google's search engine, which began in 1998.

Intelligent agents, also known as knowbots, bots, or simply robots, algorithms developed for use in the Internet, rapidly evolved during the 1990's, time where e-mail users grew significantly with the creation of the World Wide Web4. The essential idea of these software was to serve as assistants to e-mail users, helping them in their daily tasks, such as automatic saving, transferring to trash undesirable messages, automatically presenting the e-mail address of a contact when they write a new message, etc. To do so, the agent should learn to compare current situations and stored information, associating various characteristics of use of the account owner, and suggesting or simply executing pre-determined tasks. The user also could teach their agent, in a way of obtaining

4 About the intelligent agents and their historic development, refer to J. Bradshaw, Software agents (1997), and S. Johnson, Interface Culture (2001).

better results of their actions. Over time, the different agents of each user began to act in a collaborative form, exchanging information, aiming to improve the so-called assistant service (MAES, 1997). Well, with all that architecture that was already working by the end of the 1990's, they had what was necessary to create the revolution that came in the 21st century. An intelligent agent that could build a user profile, storing information on their activities, exchanging information with other agents and, finally, deliberating on actions autonomously. The basis of network digital automata were released, not being only technological, but also philosophical. That is because, behind the mathematic capacity of these algorithms, there was a background issue that guided them: the choice and decision in the user's place. What to choose to build a profile? How to correlate characteristics resulting from repetitive actions of the user? How and in what moment to decide on a determined action to be taken autonomously? What information to receive and supply other agents in the network? The more an intelligent agent learns, the more it will be apt to decide for its user. Thus, the *collective digital automaton*, which would induce a supposed collective intelligence, by the end of the 1990's, gave place to the *network digital automaton*, completely controlled by network use patterns that their own users make, and it is on service for the forces of the market and systems of government, whether they are democratic or authoritarian. As affirmed by Eli Pariser, in his book, *The Invisible Filter:*

> The new generation of online filters examines what we apparently like – the things we do, or the things people similar to us like – and try to make extrapolations. They are prediction mechanisms that create and constantly refine a theory on who we are and what we will do or want to follow. Together, these mechanisms create an exclusive universe of information to each one of us, which fundamentally alters the way we face ideas and information. (PARISER, 2012, p. 14)

The intelligent agent, that was developed to help users in their e-mails, now works to follow them in everything they do on the Internet, using every type of information to build a profile of each individual.

Everyone's personal data began to be a part of a network business, and that was the way of overcoming the big crisis of 2000. But the price to be paid on the expansion of network algorithms, that we can only measure in a very embryonic way, is to be imprisoned in bubbles of information, which define what can be read and consumed, who you can relate to and how you should choose and decide whatever you want. As Pariser warns, the closed universe of filters can "affect our capacity of deciding how we want to live". And still:

> When we enter in a bubble of filters, we allow the companies that develop them to choose the options that will be aware of. Maybe we think that we are the owners of our own destiny, but the personalization can lead us to a type of informative determinism, in which what we click in the past can determine what we will see next. And, with that, we get caught in an static version, increasingly narrow, of who we are – a never-ending repetition of ourselves. (PARISER, 2012, p. 20)

In addition to that, there is the boom of social media, that began around 2004 with Orkut and was consolidated with Facebook and its branches. With these platforms, the digital automaton now begins to absorb the biggest part of people's attention, who voluntarily feed them with personal information, making their lives circulate daily with network filters. As Andrew Keen asks, in his text *Digital Vertigo*, "All the 8 billion human beings would have to migrate – as settlers in a social media promise land – to this new central nervous system of society?" (KEEN, 2012, p. 20). Or, as Pariser warns, in an allusion to the world-wide meta-brain that constitutes social media "the personalized filters cut the synapsis of this brain. Without knowing, we are going under a type of global lobotomy" (PARISER, 2012, p. 23).

The most recent step of Web robots is the incorporation of semantic processing in their filters. That gives the intelligent agent the capacity of "understanding" texts, and, equally, creating a dialogue from pre-defined themes. That capacity, even though it is still limited in deeper semantic aspects, allows the digital automaton to work online simulating a spiritual automaton. But now, unlike the cinematographic processes, that

were supported in moving images and were chained into a circuit with the viewer's thoughts, the digital automaton can act in the level of user suggestions, can interfere in more sophisticated decision processes. That results in the new network digital automata, that bring out conversations based on their users profile, translating the non-totalizable of information in specific regions of meaning, producing partial layers of meaning.

Conclusion: the new automaton of affections

In such scenario, the digital automaton induces another type of spiritual or psychological automaton in the individuals, internet users, frequent users of social media, couples to their smartphones. This other type of automaton does not chain anymore, on one hand, like the circuit of cinematographic montage, both in Eisenstein's romantic sense, the one about the revolution of the masses, and in the sense of the fascist propaganda, which alienated the masses, the automaton becoming a puppet of the grand paranoid leader. On the other hand, it is not about the automaton that sees the thought challenged due to the ruptures of montage and narrative of the modern cinema, which leads it to confront with the force of the unthinkable. It is, now, something distinct, coming from the ultra-sophisticated processes of personalization happening in the network. No longer the masses, but each individual in their singularity must be called as a psychological automaton. That is because all the strength of the network digital automaton is in deepening the individual subjectivities in their choices, making them fold over themselves in the processes of decision. This is the use of systems of personification, since such choices and processes are induced by network filters from behavior patterns and goals of induction of conducts. Firstly, it is always possible to choose. Nothing stops a network user to pick whatever they may want. However, the suggestions offered in abundance in the devices installed in websites and apps of products and services, operate precisely on their capacity of choice and decision. If before the choice would prospect an obscure depth of decision, one inside of thought that forces you to choose, the choices with digital automatons always slide

over the surface of information. There is no more inside or outside, only a surface over which slides one from the other, multiplying the angsty of the need of choosing and taking one decision at a time. Now, the decision is not drawn in the depths of being, on the contrary, it is taken in the shallowest of worlds, in the midst of daily banality. In fact, the new network digital automaton ends up banalizing every individual choice and decision. That is due, inversely, to the depth of being, excavating the subjectivity of beings and giving them the illusion of decision-making, that they really own their choices.

It is in this moment that the psychological automaton becomes an affection automaton, because the processes of choice and decision pushed within the being are triggers of emotional circuits. The network user, more specifically the social network user, begins to emotionally respond to digital affections. This affectionate automaton, whose logical chain refers to the affectionate consequences of the body, lives the relation between the logical gap of thought and the emotional precipitation. The network digital automaton, through processes they develop in their algorithms of personalization, treating the individual as a mere package of information, begins to chain spiral emotional circuits in network users, ascending or descending, love or hate, narcissism or greed. That spiral refers, in turn, to the issue of the estimate of self and the other, above or below fair, as referred by Espinosa. The world of social media is a world that demands constant estimates, of self and of others. According to Espinosa, every estimate will always range from the limits above or below fair, either it is an estimate of oneself or of someone else (ESPINOSA, 2007, p. III). If the social networks are a system of estimates, than we are always involved in affectionate circuits that come from overestimation to despise of oneself, from pride to envy of the other. The psychological automaton on social networks has, therefore, by comparison, an emotional automaton, that sees itself as a product of affections of information flows. With that, it is established a circuit of emotional reactions, that can culminate in hate speech or emotional abstentions (catatonia and somnambulism). That is the example found in the television series

Black Mirror, in the episode "Free falling", in which individuals base their lives, therefore, their choices and decisions, according to the evaluations that receive, incessantly, in a social network. And because of these same evaluations, the characters submerge in an affectional spiral of euphoria and hate with themselves and others.

That is how the digital automaton induces not only the psychologic network automaton, which establishes circuits inducing their processes of choice and decision, but simultaneously, an affectionate automaton, inducing in the individuals an affectionate dynamic of estimates of themselves and those with whom they have relationship. But when we talk about the "other" in the network, generally it is about another user defined by only one profile. It isn't about, therefore, a relationship with a concrete alterity, but simply an imaginary projection of alterity in the midst of a constant flow of information. Syberberg is the filmmaker that understood the most the role of information in the context of communication, when he says that his issue is not with the individual Hitler: "'Hitler in us' does not mean only that we made Hitler as much as he made us, or that all of us have potential fascist elements, but rather that Hitler only exists through the information that constitute his image in ourselves" In the end, anything in us, as information" (DELEUZE, 2005, p. 320). With the network digital automaton, there must emerge this new spiritual automaton, an affectionate automaton, where affection becomes simply an answer to the information that inhabit each user's profile. In the limit, the user becomes nothing more than a profile of information. But remembering Syberberg: *any information, whatever it may be, will not be enough to win Hitler.*

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