Discourse and social mobilization in the context of interactive technologies: the emergence of multiple argumentative spheres

Discurso e mobilização social no contexto das tecnologias interativas: a emergência de múltiplas esferas argumentativas

Discurso y movilización social en el contexto de las tecnologías interactivas: la aparición de múltiples esferas argumentativas

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Abstract *It discusses the emergence of multiple argumentative spheres in the context of interactive technologies. Next to journalism, representative of* traditional media, *there are social networks, the expression of a* social media, *which includes the individual as an active agent in discursive processes. With the focus upon the speech acts, it discusses Habermas´ Theory of Communicative Action, marking the distinction between communicative action, oriented towards understanding, and strategic action, oriented towards success. As empirical object, it takes Movimento DESOCUPA!, that occurred in the city of Salvador, Bahia.*
Keywords: *Discourse Ethics. Theory of communicative action. Journalism. Social Networks.*

Resumo *Discute a emergência de múltiplas esferas argumentativas no contexto das tecnologias interativas. Ao lado do jornalismo, representante da* mídia tradicional, *colocam-se as redes sociais, expressão de uma* mídia social, *que inclui o indivíduo como agente ativo nos processos discursivos. A partir dos atos de fala, discute a Teoria da Ação Comunicativa habermasiana,*

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marcando a distinção entre ação comunicativa, orientada ao entendimento, e ação estratégica, orientada ao êxito. Toma como objeto empírico o Movimento DESOCUPA!, que ocorreu na cidade de Salvador, Bahia.
Palavras-chave: *Ética do discurso. Teoria da ação comunicativa. Jornalismo. Redes sociais.*

Resumen *Trata sobre la aparición de múltiples esferas de argumentación en el contexto de las tecnologías interactivas. Al lado del periodismo, representante de los* medios tradicionales, *ahora están las redes sociales, expresión de los* medios sociales, *que incluye al individuo como un agente activo en los procesos discursivos. A partir de los actos de habla, discute la teoría de la acción comunicativa de Habermas, que marca la distinción entre la acción comunicativa orientada al entendimiento, y la acción estratégica, orientada al éxito. Se toma como objeto empírico el Movimiento ¡DESOCUPA!, que tuvo lugar en la ciudad de Salvador, Bahía.*
Palabras-clave: *Ética del discurso. Teoría de la acción comunicativa. Periodismo. Redes Sociales.*

The present article discusses the emergence of multiple argumentative spheres in the context of the interactive technologies. It is based upon the Habermasian concept of "public sphere" (HABERMAS, 2003a) as a space of formation and circulation of concepts which are fundamental for the articulation of topics of public interest, in which the media assume a relevant role. By assuming that the media and, particularly, journalism, play a central role in the organization and circulation of the social discourses in the present time, we come across with the new reality propelled by the emergence of the social networks, which permit the citizen´s insertion into discursive contexts. Instead of being a mere news consumer, the individual becomes a producer and an agent of contents circulation.

From the viewpoint of the discursive impact on the social organization, it is possible to perceive a new polarization of forces with regard to the circulation of discourses "committed" to the demands of groups, companies and ideologies. The new polarization exactly concerns the possibility the social groups have to participate in the informational fluxes, not only in the capture of information, but also in the discourse production and distribution.

There is a concordance with regard to the determinant potential of the space which is occupied socially by the mass media in the centrality of the organization and distribution of the narratives. The formation/information of the public opinion necessarily goes through the present ubiquitous stage of the media, which does not only offer information, but a vision of the world, framed according to peculiar criteria in the communicational field, generally guided by political and economic claims. The relevance of discursive ethics is heading for this very direction, when it recommends, in the first place, the adhesion to a rational model, which permits the individual to transit between distinct truths, in order to get to only one, the result of a long discussion. The process, which must ensure the wide participation and equality of access, is as important as the result of the discussion. From the participant, on his part, one presupposes-the use of true arguments and the non-contradiction (HABERMAS, 2003b).

For the questionings of the present article, it is fundamental to understand the new discursive organization which renders possible the "discursive confrontation", when distinct opinion groups start publishing different viewpoints. The perception of such phenomenon permits to resume the questionings about the hegemonic and contra-hegemonic processes, which can be verified on the basis of methodologies of critical media analysis, providing the possibility to evaluate the strategies and positions of distinct groups. Theses new narrative possibilities can broaden the notion of visibility and even, the disputes for visibility regimes.

Our objective is to question the way in which the individual deals with the binomial discourse and power. For this purpose the institution "journalism" will be evaluated in the context of the new possibilities of a discursive field which opens itself to the citizen´s participation. Instead of the traditional filters which historically mark the mediatic processes, we have experienced facts which question the former mediatic centralism, as the main (if not unique) discursive agent endowed with the capacity to influence the formation and circulation of public opinion. As empiric object, we will take the *Movimento* DESOCUPA!,[2] [DESOCUPA Movement] which arose from an anxiety of the population of he city of Salvador, capital of the State of Bahia, Brazil. The main motivation of the movement concerns, according to the organization, the abuses in the municipal administration, especially in that which concerns the superposition of private interests onto public ones. For the analysis, we will consider the two main daily newspapers of Bahia, *A Tarde* and *Correio,* and the articulation by means of the social networks undertaken by the *Movimento DESOCUPA!*

Discourse and social action

As far as the studies about language and discourse are concerned, when we deal with the acting, we perceive that action and discourse are one

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[2] <http://movimentodesocupa.wordpress.com/historico/>. Access on February 15th 2012.

and the same thing. By means of language and of the ways to take position in the discourse, man, a being equal to any other human being, seeks to establish his difference by means of the alterity, or the equality in the difference. Every human being, although equal to all beings of his species, is unique, a fact which expresses itself by means of subjectivity that presents itself on the basis of the action and, at the same time, in the narrative around the action. (ARENDT, 2001).

It is in this perspective that studies appear concerning the relationship between discourse and power. By defining man as a language being, who confers meaning on his actions by the means of discourse we assume that man is predestined to discursive life. As Habermas affirms (2003b, p. 122-3), even if the sceptic would like to renounce his role of a member in an argumentative community, he could not deny that he belongs to a socio-cultural way of life and that his life has been developing in the contexts of the communicative acting. Although he supposedly gives up his participation in such an argumentative community, it is impossible to think a human life totally separated from the daily communicative practice. Participation occurs, even if it is for trifling questions, through assent and refusal, "yes" and "no", for example, in case of enquiries, even those considered not to be very relevant. Thus, it is impossible to demonstrate a "jump out of the communicative acting" (HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 123).

The life of an argumentative community occurs by means of language which permits the inclusion of the individual and of his opinions. According to Arendt´s proposition (2001, p. 189), man inserts himself twice into the world, at his birth and when he includes himself in the world through words and acts: "it is through words and acts that we insert ourselves into the human world; and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we confirm and assume the original and singular fact of our original physical appearance".

According to Heidegger (2008; 2009), language is the basis for the constitution or the emergence of the Being. As the author points out (HEIDEGGER, 2008, p. 326), "language is the being´s dwelling place".

By means of this affirmation, which will characterize all his work, he emphasizes that man constitutes himself as such in language and through language. The focus is on the being, or on his manifestation, which occurs by means of language. The being occurs in the immanence, when he says "thinking is the being´s thinking" (HEIDEGGER, 2008, p. 329).

By affirming that language is the being´s dwelling place, Heidegger makes an important contribution to the understanding of the relevance of language for the constitution of humankind. Through language, man constitutes himself and builds the bases for his survival. The word ethics is a good example with regard to this relation. In its Greek etymology, *ethos*, designates shelter, dwelling place, space of protection and fundamental space for the organization of life (LIMA VAZ, 1999). Understood like this, the space-ethos is not natural, but a human construct for the human being. Of course, animals also choose their shelters, but the distinction resides in the rationality which accompanies the human action, with a view to man assuming his highest potentials. Through language man builds his shelter, the dwelling place which permits common life and exchange, the formation of individualities and which also assures him protection with regard to the others and to every tentative of arbitrariness. On the basis of language and of the consciousness regarding its use, the Being manifests himself and sets himself in conditions of dispute in the argumentative sphere.

Habermas´ contributions (2002; 2003b; 2010) to the understanding of the relevance of discourse in the social field derives, above all, from his conception of discourse as "action". The central conception is based upon the idea that the "communicative action" is as relevant as any other kind of action. Thus linguistic understanding is the mechanism which coordinates all the actions.

For the purpose of understanding, we call the "communicative action" "discursive action". The "discursive action" can be split up into two: communicative action and strategic action. The subtlety which distinguishes such actions resides in the *telos*, or in the intended objective: success or understanding. According to Habermas (2010, p. 331-333), the

communicative action is non-strategic and oriented towards understanding, whereas the strategic action is exclusively guided by the desire for success, as we see:

a) **Strategic use of language**: the discursive action is calculated having in view the intended objective. The discourse is conducted on the basis of *teleological* expectations, so that the success of a discursive enterprise is the result of a calculated action as well as of a calculated omission. Through language one seeks to influence the formation of opinions. For this modality, Habermas (2010, p. 331) establishes two categories: 1) instrumental action – that which is oriented by success or towards success; and 2) strategic action – oriented towards success or by success and, in this case, using rational criteria, one seeks to act on the decisions of an opponent/interlocutor.

b) **Communicative use of language**: in this case, the plans of action of the involved actors are not led by an egocentric calculation of results, but by the search for understanding. "In the communicative action the participants are not primarily guided by their own success; they rather pursue their individual objectives under the condition that their respective plans of action can harmonize with each other on the basis of a shared definition of the situation". As Habermas points it out, every agreement that one achieves communicatively must have a rational basis, that is to say, it cannot be *imposed* by any of the involved parties.

For the organization of the system of the discursive action, Habermas (2002; 2003b; 2010) has recourse to the "Speech acts", as proposed by Austin (2008) and Searle (2009). It is by means of a speech action that a discursive agent includes himself in a process of cooperated search for truth or seeks to act on his interlocutor and to achieve a personal objective. With regard to the principle of the discursive action, Austin (2008) says that two types of expressions can be localized: constatives

and executives/performatives. Some expressions, the constatives, only make something known, which can be true or false. On their part, the executive expressions are characterized by the fact that the person who uses them *does* something, executes something "by saying". Examples of executive expressions are: "I apologize", "I baptize you", "I promise". As the definition says, a performative "indicates that to utter an expression is to execute an action and that this action is not conceived normally as a mere saying something" (AUSTIN, 2008, p. 47).

In order that such an "enunciated" act be true, it is necessary that the enunciating agent has the power that confers authority upon him to perform that which is enunciated. On the interlocutor´s part, it is necessary to have the express acknowledgment of the enunciator´s authority (HABERMAS, 2002, p. 72). Who promises and who will receive the promised action equally place themselves in a situation of expectation, because precision and morality are equally in favour of the common expression, according to which *the engaged word commits us*" (AUSTIN, 2008, p. 51).

It is still interesting to note that the time of the verbal action can change the strength of the discursive enterprise. For example, by saying "I apologized", "I baptized you", "I promised", such actions can be true as well as false, because there is no certainty as far as the engagement of the word is concerned. With regard to promises achieved in the present time, we perceive the bestowing of veracity upon what is enunciated, because to say and to do are one and the same thing.

According to Austin (2008), the acts of speech are divided in the following way:

1. Locutionary act: corresponds to the act of pronouncing an utterance, or the contents of an utterance; that which one says;

2. Illocutionary act: corresponds to the act the locutor performs when he pronounces an utterance in certain communicative conditions and with certain intentions, such as to order, to inform, to criticize, to ask,

to invite, to threaten, etc. Thus in an illocutionary act, the communicative intention of execution is being associated with the meaning of a determined utterance. In order that such speech act produces an effect, there must be a connexion between the interlocutors, such as the acknowledgment of the pertinence of what is said, of the place of speech, of the enunciator and of the authority bestowed upon this agent, such as the judge, the priest, etc.

3. Perlocutionary act: corresponds to the effects which a given illocutionary act produces on the allocutory. Verbs such as to convince, to persuade or to frighten occur in this type of speech acts, because they inform us about the effect produced on the allocutory or interlocutor. That which characterizes a perlocutionary act is the clear intention of the agent to act upon his interlocutor, in order to achieve a precise objective in advance. There is no discussion, neither cooperated search for an objective, but the aim, in a teleological relationship, is what moves the discursive action.

As Habermas points out (2010, p. 334):

> Austin calls locutionary the contents of enunciative sentences ("p") or of the enunciative nominalized sentences ("q p"). With the *locutionary* acts, the speaker expresses states of things; he says something. With the *illocutionary* acts, the agent performs an action by saying something. The illocutionary role determines the way in which one uses a sentence ("M p"): affirmation, promise, order, confession, etc. [...] with the *perlocutionary* acts, the speaker seeks to cause an effect on his listener. By means of the performance of a speech act, he causes something in the world. Thus the three acts distinguished by Austin can be characterized in the following way: *to say* something; *to do* by saying something (that is to say, to do *via* to say something); *to cause* something through what is being done by saying something.

Thus the intentionality of the communicative action can be seen as in a *crescendo*. In an initial stage, the locutionary level only enunciates states of things, it says only. The illocutionary level is equivalent to a transition, because "things" are performed by saying – things are made of words. Finally, the perlocutionary level is only possible when one resumes the anterior act, the illocutionary, since it is characterized by the strength of an action, which is being announced, and on the basis of this principle, it intends to produce an effect on the interlocutor – things are achieved by words. The main element for the understanding of the speech acts becomes the level of persuasion which is performed by means of a perlocutionary act, or the achieved convincing.

Austin (2008, p. 145) defines the perlocutionary act like this:

> Frequently and normally too, to say something produces certain consequences or effects on the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, or of whom utters the expression, or of other people. And it is possible that by saying something we do it with the purpose, the intention, or the design to produce such effects. Thus, thinking about this, we can say that who utters the expression, performed an act which can be described, making a merely oblique reference, or not making any reference at all to the performance of a locutionary or perlocutionary act. We will call the performance of an act of this kind a *perlocutionary* act or *perlocution*.

Habermas (2010, p. 335) draws attention to the fact that the perlocutionary act has a teleological character, that is to say, its objective is to achieve a certain end. The immediate meaning is only associated with that which was uttered in a contingent way. The procedures adopted by a determined discourse, on the basis of the perlocutionry acts, can be motivated by a utilitarian finalism, the main objective of which is not the communication of a state of things, but to act upon the interlocutor, make him believe in something, bring him to act in a determined way.

Going out from the perspective of the speech acts, we perceive a modification in the way of understanding the discourse and the processes of

meaning it engenders. Instead of drawing attention only to that which is said, the context and the rules of the discourse must also be understood, as well as the social conventions (SEARLE, 2010). There is an important displacement in the way of conceiving discourse: instead of being seen only as a result of an individual intentionality, the meaning is being conceived as the result of social practices, as the studies on pragmatics point out.

In a different way, according to Habermas (2002, p. 68), the illocutionary acts are guided by mutual understanding:

> Illocutionary objectives cannot be achieved through another way than that of cooperation, because they are not available to the individual participant of the communication, in the same way as the effects that can be produced in a casual way. A speaker cannot attribute *to himself* an illocutionary effect as if he were the agent that situates his activity in the line of an end, describing to himself the result of his intervention in the whole set of processes of the objective world.

Thus the illocutionary acts are the primordial basis of the communicative action, since, for the performance of the understanding between the participants of a discursive process, it is fundamental that the actions be oriented towards understanding. The illocutionary acts, by means of the cooperation principle on which they are based, favour the interaction between the speakers. Thus every agreement resulting from a communicative action is the explicitation of a consensus rationally achieved, that is to say, it is not imposed by a capricious will. The success which moves a communicative action is the very consensual understanding, for which every true argument is valid and possible.

On the other hand, a discursive action oriented towards success does not presuppose rational choices, neither understanding but only the achievement of a pre-established objective. Discourse serves calculated objectives, which are achieved through strategies that recognize in language a strategic potential like any other. However, in order to be wholly integrated in the world of life, a strategic action can simulate all

the procedures of a discursive action and, in a process of ritualization, it can give right of speech to opponents within a totally calculated reality. There is no real discussion neither the search for consensuses, but the tight performance of teleological actions. For the performance of such a model, the basis is in the perlocutionary act, by means of which a speaker seeks to cause something in his interlocutor.

As Habermas points out (2002, p. 73), the latent strategic use of language is parasitic of the normal use of language. In order that the strategic action functions discursively, at least one of the involved parties must believe that language is being used to the end of understanding. Dissimulation becomes an indispensable integrant part of the communication processes oriented towards success.

Journalism X Social networks: between the communicative action and the strategic action

Among the questionings which motivate the present article, there is a look at the possibilities of the discursive action of journalism in contemporary society. Journalism must be included in the perspective of the communicative action, because its discursive articulation promotes, in thesis, the formation of social consensuses. The "place" of the exposition of different viewpoints about a determined topic belongs to journalism. Such procedure justifies the pertinence of journalism for the experience of democracy, as well as for the survival of the republican ideals.

However, we must consider that by saying "journalism" we are not mentioning an institution independent of a party and of time, but a field of action which evidences political and economic disputes for the consolidation of a social capital (BOURDIEU, 1989; 2008). Thus the following question arises: to which extent does journalism perform its actions oriented towards its own success or towards understanding, in the search for consensuses which favour society?

Journalism is commonly associated with the idea of public interest, but not everything in journalism is public interest, understood as the dealing with topics that are pertinent to the good functioning of democracy, for example (GOMES, 2009). In journalism there are many topics which concern the interests of "mere" consumers, such as aesthetic products, fashion, etc., but which nonetheless "are to be found" in journalism and must receive the same stylistic and ethical treatment.

In Habermas´ thought there is a reorientation, for example, since *Mudança estrutural da Esfera Pública* (2003a),[3] [*The Structural Modification of the Public Sphere*: *Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*] when he affirms that "critical journalism is abolished by the manipulative one (2003a, p. 210), in a reference to the role of publicization of ideals assumed by journalism. Such reorientation appears in the opening which shines through in the capacity of the individual´s relationship with the media (HABERMAS, 2010). The so-called "deliberative model" recommends the possibility to ensure a variety of public opinions (HABERMAS, 2008).

In order to enable the circulation and formation of a true plurality of opinions, the role of the new non-centralized communication modalities, which are open to the citizen´s participation, must be taken into consideration. Traditional journalism can represent social interests, but also entrepreneurial interests. On the other hand, social groups can organize themselves in favour of a common interest, with a view to social well-being. We can say that we see, more and more, clashes over topics of public interest, which mark real entrenchments.

In order to illustrate the referred social dispute, we will evaluate the *movimento DESOCUPA*! with a page on *Facebook*[4] and *blog*,[5] where the definition of the movement can be localized:

[3] Published in 1961.
[4] <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Movimento-Desocupa/145341898917077>. Access on February 15th 2012.
[5] <http://movimentodesocupa.wordpress.com/>. Access on February 15th 2012.

> The *Movimento DESOCUPA*! came into being because of the increasing dissatisfaction of the population of Salvador with the abuses and absurdities of the municipal administration, above all as far as the sale of the city to private interests is concerned. It does not have any connexion with any party, neither financial supports of any kind. The strength of this movement directly arises from the citizens of Salvador who were tired of feeling ashamed of the city they love.[6]

As it is pointed out by the *movimento DESOCUPA!*, this emblematic case derives from the abuses which involve the *"Camarote* Salvador".[7] [Salvador Box]. For the structuring of the box, the company made an agreement with the City Hall and regained a square, foreseeing the use of the space for the undertaking. The place known as Praça de Ondina [Ondina Square] remained prohibited for more than three months, between December of 2011 and March of 2012. The topic was widely debated on the social networks and a public demonstration against the privatization of public spaces on the part of the City Hall of Salvador was convoked. The protest was prohibited by Justice, by means of an action undertaken by the company responsible for the *Camarote* Salvador, under the allegation that the demonstration would endanger its patrimony and the employees´ physical integrity.

This short report is able to evidence a journalistic appeal deriving from the facts in question. For the objectives of the present article, we consider: a) the two main daily newspapers of the city – *A Tarde* and *Correio*, in their respective coverage about the *Movimento DESOCUPA!* and the *Camarote* Salvador; b) the formation of an argumentative sphere by means of the social networks. With regard to the newspapers, we consider the month of January of 2012, the period of the popular demonstrations against the *Camarote* Salvador.

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[6] <http://movimentodesocupa.wordpress.com/historico/>. Access on February 15th 2012.

[7] The carnival of Salvador, capital of the State of Bahia, Brazil, is passing through modifications deriving from a disordered economic exploitation. Many public spaces become spaces of private use, by means of agreements more and more questioned by the local population.

There is a clear discursive position which marks a distance between the newspapers A *Tarde* and *Correio*. There is even the impression that the newspapers do not only speak about distinct realities, but to different publics. In the studies concerning the mediatic products which dispute the same group of public, we affirm that there is a similarity as far as the thematic subjects and the kind of approach of concurrent products are concerned (DALMONTE, 2009). But it is not what we observe:

During the month of January of 2012, the newspaper A *Tarde* presented three publications:

- Judge prohibits a demonstration in Ondina organized through the web. (14/01/2012)
- Act in Ondina reunites more than 400, says PM [Military Police]. (15/01/2012)
- *DESOCUPA!*, published on the reader´s space, page *Opinião* [*Opinion*], signed by Angelo Serpa, professor of the Universidade Federal da Bahia [Federal University of the State of Bahia]. (17/01/2012)

In the period in question, January of 2012, the newspaper *Correio* did not publish anything about the subject.[8] We presume that the justification resides in the involvement of one of its owners in the undertaking of the *Camarote* Salvador. This explains the silencing which marks the journalistic coverage of the period with regard to the events. In order to perceive the polarization created around the whole story, a journalist of A *Tarde*, participant of the action, was pointed out as the leader of the movement and is responding judicially to the question.

Although it is possible to perceive a major opening in the newspaper A *Tarde* to the question relative to the disordered use of the soil in the capital of Bahia, as well as to the private use of public spaces, the capacity of mobilization and the repercussion is outside the traditional domain

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[8] The unique reference to the fact appears on December 21st 2011, in the section *Leitores* [*Readers*]. It is a note sent by a reader, requiring a position of the newspaper, entitled *Lazer em Ondina* [*Leisure in Ondina*]: "there are few public spaces for leisure in our city. In Ondina, one of these few places is totally unavailable to the population due to the building of the Salvador box. I would like *CORREIO* to make a report about this occupation"[sic].

of journalism. In Angelo Serpa´ s words, in a text published in *A Tarde* (17/01/2012), we note the change of direction on the part of the *soteropolitanos:*[9] "who says that the *soteropolitanos* are apathetic and accept resignedly the lack of public planning and management in the city?"

The Habermasion argumentative sphere, sign of modernity, extends itself beyond the traditional journalistic action. The communicative action is counting on new social actors and the cooperative search for the consensus reaches propositive levels, as we see in the events described below, which count on wide propagation on the social networks:[10]

- **Debate** – Salvador deserves another LOUOS:[11] February 27th.
- **Participation in radio program**: DESOCUPA on Rádio Itaparica FM, February 28th.
- **Implementation of the GT of Technical Analyses**: on February 29th, in the Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo [Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism] of the Universidade Federal da Bahia [Federal University of Bahia], occurred the implementation of the Grupo de Trabalho de Análises Técnicas [Work team of Technical Analyses] of the *MOVIMENTO DESOCUPA*, composed of architects, urbanists, and engineers of the *MOVIMENTO DESOCUPA*, the work team also counts on representatives of the IAB-BA (Instituto de Arquitetos do Brasil [Institute of Brazilian Architects]), of the CREA-BA (Conselho Regional de Engenharia e Agronomia [Regional Council of Engineering and Agronomy) and of the SBU (Sociedade Brasileira de Urbanismo) [Brazilian Society of Urbanism]).
- **Debate**: The city we want – debate about the praça de Ondina, March 7th.

[9] The people who live in Salvador, the capital of the State of Bahia.. Term of Greek origin: Sotero = Salvador.

[10] Source: <http://www.facebook.com/pages/Movimento-Desocupa/145341898917077>. Access on February 15tj 2012.

[11] Lei de Uso e Ocupação do Solo de Salvador [Law of the Use and Occupation of the Soil of Salvador].

Journalism plays the roles of the selection, the framing and the propagation of relevant topics which can sometimes have a social repercussion, as the studies relative to the agenda-setting indicate. However, the inverse way has been more and more common: the movement within the social networks regulates the traditional media. Thus the new places of speech, which include the citizen in the discursive processes, are consolidated.

An example of this change is the *Movimento DESOCUPA*, which gains shape and visibility through the social networks. When it gets to the traditional media, it gets there in an unbalanced way, because only one newspaper, *A Tarde*, inserts it into its coverage. In the case of *Correio*, the silencing, from the discursive viewpoint, is also a way of saying. Things are being affirmed by means of the non-said (DALMONTE, 2011a) and silence signifies (ORLANDI, 2007).

By choosing not to cover the *Movimento* or the repercussion it provoked, *Correio*, through its silence, implements a *strategic action*, the *telos* of which is the disqualification of the movement. Thus a speech act also constitutes itself of that which is not said, because it acts in a perlocutionary way on the interlocutors, providing an effect of the meaning of absence/inexistence of the fact, or irrelevance. The objective of the silence, as a discursive position, is the strategic achievement of success by means of political and economic claims

The discursive position of *Correio*, which, for reasons of market, does not cover topics relative to the *Movimento DESOCUPA*!, is the same in all the vehicles of the group, including Television and sites. Some material was published on sites and was deleted afterwards, conferring unity on the adopted guidelines. To the silencing strategies are aggregated those of deleting, reinforcing the practice of the strategic action of discourse.

In a certain sense, the communicative and strategic actions collide, because the contemporary reality of the social networks allows the organization of multiple argumentative spheres and the rational search for truths, having in view the possibility of a conflict of arguments consid-

ered valid. In the present context of interactive media, we can point out the discursive decentralization which is provided to the detriment of the traditional media. In opposition to the former model, in which the media defined which discourses should circulate and in which way they would circulate, we see now the centralization of groups until now marginal and without voice. Instead of being only the object of alien narratives, they present their own narratives.

The centralization, we referred to, concerns the place through which pass the informative fluxes that have a repercussion on our society, like in a contemporary agora. The vehiculation of a discourse in a traditional space does not matter so much, what matters in fact is its circulation potential on multiple platforms, establishing multiple argumentative spheres.

Finally it must be emphasized that the social actor, who acts discursively on the social networks, develops a level of consciousness concerning the discursive action, which we call "consciousness of discourse" (DALMONTE, 2011b). The consciousness of discourse, important element for the formation of consensuses in democratic regimes acts as a basis for the argumentative dispute. We believe that such dispute becomes even more relevant to the degree that the individuals and groups take hold of the instrumental means of the communicative acting and instead of only uttering opinions, they mark positions. The contesting act does not appear isolated, but as a spontaneous occurrence, but it is also assumed argumentatively. The consciousness of discourse marks a kind of position of the subject within the discursive field, characterized by a high level of consciousness of the power of discourse.

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